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SMITH AND HOGAN AT VILLANOVA:
REFLECTIONS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW, THE
DEFINITION OF RAPE, AND WHAT AMERICA STILL
NEEDS TO LEARN FROM ENGLAND
MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY*
THE following Essay was presented at the Norman J. Shachoy Sympo-sium in September 2015, commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of
the Villanova Law Review.  Primarily, it is a comment on two articles pub-
lished in the Villanova Law Review: John C. Smith, Subjective or Objective? Ups
and Downs of the Test of Criminal Liability in England1 and T. Brian Hogan,
Crime, Punishment and Responsibility.2  The essays, authored by two of En-
gland’s most influential criminal law theorists, take up the broad issue of
criminal responsibility.  Moreover, in Smith’s contribution, he offered in-
sights regarding how to think about the specific issue of mens rea in rape.
In addition to engaging and honoring the works of Smith and Hogan as
they appeared in the Villanova Law Review, this Essay will defend two claims
concerning comparative Anglo–American criminal law.  First, English
criminal law has long had a more salutary approach than many American
jurisdictions when it comes to asking the right kind of questions regarding
the mens rea of rape.  Second, when it comes to substantive answers re-
garding what the mens rea of rape should be, American jurisdictions still
have much to learn from England’s example.3
I. SMITH AND HOGAN AT VILLANOVA
It is difficult to overstate the impact Sir John Cyril Smith (1922–2003)
and T. Brian Hogan (1932–1996) had on the development of English
criminal law and, in particular, on English thinking regarding criminal
responsibility.  Their jointly authored textbook, first published in 1965
and now in its fourteenth edition (edited by David Ormerod and Karl
Laird) has served as a must-read text for generations of English law stu-
dents.4  Indeed, the book “quickly outstripped its origins as a work for
* My thanks to Kristen Ashe, Editor-in-Chief of Villanova Law Review, and her
fellow editors, for allowing the Villanova Law faculty to hijack the 2015 annual
Norman J. Shachoy Symposium to offer a collection of essays honoring the sixtieth
anniversary of the Villanova Law Review.  It is a great honor to work with such a
dedicated group of students.
1. John C. Smith, Subjective or Objective? Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal
Liability in England, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1179 (1982).
2. T. Brian Hogan, Crime, Punishment and Responsibility, 24 VILL. L. REV. 690
(1979).
3. By rape, I mean to refer to both “rape” and “sexual assault.”
4. See generally SMITH & HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW (David Ormerod & Karl Laird,
eds., 14th ed. 2015).
(509)
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students to become an authoritative treatise on criminal law, widely relied
on throughout the common law world.”5  Just slightly overstating the mat-
ter, perhaps, the Oxford University Press website heralds the book as “the
bible” of English criminal law.6
If Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law is the bible, their subjectivist ac-
count of criminal responsibility is the gospel.  With characteristic clarity,
Smith offers the following explanation in his opening remarks at his Villa-
nova lecture:
The definition of a crime usually, though not invariably, requires
proof of 1) an act by the defendant; 2) certain results caused by
that act; and 3) certain circumstances.  A simple illustration may
be found in the offense of causing criminal damage to property
belonging to another.  The act is the physical movement made by
the defendant.  The result is the destruction of, or damage to,
the property.  The circumstance is that the property belongs to
another.  The defendant may not be convicted unless each of
these elements is proved.  It must also appear that the defendant
intended to make the physical movement, but there is rarely any
difficulty in proving this intent.  In those crimes known as of-
fenses of “absolute” or “strict” liability, the duty of the prosecu-
tion may end at this point.  But in most crimes, particularly
serious crimes, they must go on to prove a degree of fault with
respect to each element of the offense, whether a result or a cir-
cumstance.  If the defendant is to be held responsible for causing
the result in the circumstances in which it is a criminal offense, it
ought to be shown that he was at fault with respect to each of
these elements.  The question with which I am concerned today
is the nature of this fault.
Smith continues, explaining the two competing approaches to defin-
ing mens rea that have so thoroughly influenced English criminal law: the
subjective and objective.
By a subjective test I mean that, where the definition of the crime
requires a result, the defendant may not be held liable unless it is
proved that at the time of his act he knew or foresaw that the
result would or might be caused by his act.  Where the definition
includes a circumstance, under the subjective test the defendant
may not be held liable unless it is proved that he knew at the time
of his act that the circumstance would or might exist.
5. See Ian Dennis, Sir John Smith, GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2003, 9:31 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/news/2003/mar/26/guardianobituaries [https://perma
.cc/38RF-TB5H].
6. See Description: Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, OXFORD U. PRESS, http://
global.oup.com/ukhe/product/smith-and-hogans-criminal-law-9780198702313?cc
=gb&lang=en& [https://perma.cc/7LJQ-6EVH] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/9
2016] SMITH AND HOGAN AT VILLANOVA 511
By an objective test I mean that the defendant may be held
liable where it is proved that he ought to have known or foreseen
that the result would or might be caused, and that he ought to
have known that the circumstance existed or might exist.  Under
this test, it does not matter if the particular defendant, in fact,
did not know these things; it is sufficient that a reasonable and
prudent man would have known them.7
There are two aspects of the subjectivist approach to defining mens
rea that are worth emphasizing.  First, subjectivism is opposed to strict lia-
bility, especially when it comes to defining serious offenses.  Rather, sub-
jectivists endorse the “principle of correspondence”—the requirement
that each and every element of the actus reus have a corresponding culpa-
ble mental state (mens rea).8  Criminal offenses that violate the principle
of correspondence include all full strict liability offenses (that is, crimes
that require no proof of mens rea whatsoever), as well as partial strict lia-
bility offenses.  Partial strict liability offenses require proof of mens rea
corresponding to one or more, but not to all, elements of the actus reus.
As Hogan observed in his lecture at Villanova, “It is often overlooked that
elements of strict liability are imported into many serious crimes . . . .”9
Two clear examples of partial strict liability offenses are felony mur-
der and statutory rape (as it is defined in many jurisdictions).  The actus
reus elements of felony murder include (1) causing the death of a human
being, (2) during the commission of a felony—yet the only mens rea re-
quirement is that the defendant possess the mens rea to commit the fel-
ony.10  As such, liability as to causing the death is strict—there is no mens
rea requirement corresponding to that element of the actus reus.  Simi-
larly, in many jurisdictions, statutory rape is partially strict.  The actus reus
elements of statutory rape include (1) engaging in sexual intercourse, (2)
with someone under the age of consent—yet, in many jurisdictions, the
only mens rea requirement is that the defendant intend to engage in sex-
ual intercourse.  In these jurisdictions, there is no requirement of mens
rea corresponding to the actus reus element regarding the victim’s age.
According to Hogan, doctrines such as felony murder and strict statutory
rape “have no place in a rational scene of things which, in matters of crimi-
7. Smith, supra note 1, at 1179–80 (emphasis added).
8. See ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
(7th ed. 2013).
9. Hogan, supra note 2, at 693.
10. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b) (West 2016).  A variety of com-
plicated doctrines have developed to restrain the scope of felony murder.  For fur-
ther discussion, see Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV.
403 (2011).
3
Dempsey: Smith and Hogan at Villanova: Reflections on Anglo-American Crimi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
512 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 509
nal responsibility, must look to the accused’s intentions and not impose
liability on objective principles of causation.”11
The principle of correspondence is a tremendously clarifying concep-
tual tool for asking the right kinds of questions in defining and debating
criminal responsibility.  While Andrew Ashworth is to be credited with
coining the term, surely the influence of Smith and Hogan’s subjectivist
account of criminal responsibility created the intellectual and legal envi-
ronment in which the idea has flourished.12
It is possible, however, to honor the principle of correspondence
without endorsing Smith and Hogan’s strong version of subjectivism.  One
might require a mens rea element in correspondence to each and every
element of the actus reus, but acknowledge that negligence may sometimes
be sufficiently culpable to establish the corresponding mens rea.  If this
thought is plausible, then it pays to consider whether negligence can ever
be sufficiently culpable to establish criminal fault.  According to a widely
accepted definition, criminal negligence consists in failing to recognize a
“substantial and unjustifiable risk,” where the risk is “of such a nature and
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor’s situation.”13  As I characterize it for my students,
being criminally negligent consists in being clueless to the risks of harm
one poses to others.  Yet, as I emphasize, not just any cluelessness will sat-
isfy the standard of criminal negligence.  Rather, the defendant’s clueless-
ness must rise to the level of criminal culpability—that is, he must be
criminally culpably clueless.
In some cases, where the harms we seek to prevent are sufficiently
serious (e.g., death), criminal negligence has been widely regarded as a
sufficient mens rea.  Indeed, even otherwise committed subjectivists, such
as the Law Commission of England and Wales, have endorsed criminal
(gross) negligence as an appropriate mens rea for the offense of man-
11. Hogan, supra note 2, at 693.  I suspect Hogan said, “rational scheme of
things,” rather than “rational scene of things” in the quote above, since the former
is a familiar British phrasing.
12. See ASHWORTH & HORDER, supra note 8, at 129–30.
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).  It is, admittedly, somewhat awk-
ward to characterize negligence as a mens rea, if one conceptualizes mens rea as
referring to a state of mind.  Since negligence consists in failing to recognize a risk,
it is at best a blank state of mind.  As Chris Clarkson puts it, “it is semantic non-
sense to describe a blank state of mind as a state of mind.” CHRISTOPHER M.V.
CLARKSON, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 73 (4th ed. 2005).  Following Clarkson
and others, I take the view that mens rea is best understood according to a “norma-
tive theory of criminal culpability under which judgments as to blameworthiness
are made.” Id.; see also infra note 45.  Under this approach, “[o]ne must ascertain
the ‘mens’ (for example, that the defendant failed to consider the risk) and then
judge whether that mens is ‘rea’ (blameworthy)” under the circumstances. CLARK-
SON, supra, at 73.
4
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slaughter.14  Yet, to be clear, endorsing negligence as an acceptable mens
rea is, in principle, inconsistent with the strong version of subjectivism en-
dorsed by Smith and Hogan.
This brings us to the second aspect of a subjectivist approach that is
worthy of emphasis.  Subjectivism rejects negligence as an adequate mens
rea and instead requires that each actus reus element correspond to a
mens rea of, at least, recklessness.15  Recklessness consists in being aware
of “a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” and “consciously disregard[ing]”
the risk in circumstances where such disregard “involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a [reasonable] person would observe in
the actor’s situation.”16  The key difference between the negligent actor
and one who is reckless (or who possesses one of the “higher” mentes reae
of knowledge and intention/purpose) has to do with choice.  The reckless
actor is subjectively aware of the risk his conduct poses and yet chooses to go
ahead and take the risk nonetheless—whereas the negligent actor is not
even aware of the risk his conduct poses, and so never chooses to impose
this risk on others.
Other things being equal, both subjectivists and objectivists can agree
that the reckless actor is typically more culpable than the negligent actor.
As such, most all can endorse Hogan’s claim that “fairness demands that a
sharp distinction be drawn between the deliberate and the thoughtless.”17
Smith echoed the point forcefully in his remarks:
[I]n the case of serious crime . . . an objective standard is inap-
propriate.  Murder, rape and theft are not offenses for which
mere negligence should justify conviction.  A person who deliber-
ately chooses to bring about a particular harmful event, or who
chooses to take an unjustifiable risk of bringing about that event,
may properly be held responsible for the event when it occurs.
The person who is merely negligent does not choose to bring it
about or choose to take a risk of bringing it about.  That is a
moral difference which justifies drawing the line at this point.18
The question remains, however, whether the line we draw between
the deliberate and the thoughtless must map directly onto the outer limits
of the criminal law, leaving negligent actors beyond its reach.  For, an-
other way to mark a sharp distinction between the deliberate and the (cul-
14. See JEREMY HORDER, The Changing Face of the Law of Homicide, in HOMICIDE
LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19, 19–38 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2007); LAW COM-
MISSION, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROJECT 6 OF THE NINTH PRO-
GRAMME OF LAW REFORM: HOMICIDE 51 (Law Com. No. 304, 2006), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/228782/0030.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LJY-2N3Z].
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) for an example of the Model Penal
Code drafters adopting a presumption in favor of subjectivism.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
17. See Hogan, supra note 2, at 695.
18. Smith, supra note 1, at 1204.
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pably) thoughtless is to criminalize both, but punish the (culpably)
thoughtless person to a lesser extent.  For Smith and Hogan, however,
such an approach is unacceptable.  As Hogan rhetorically asked, “[O]n
what basis is punishment assigned for the accused’s failure to foresee or
appreciate a risk which the most of us would have recognized?”19  His an-
swer, of course, is that such punishment cannot be justified, since (he sup-
poses) negligent conduct cannot be deterred through the threat of
criminal punishment:
The punishment [for negligence] can hardly deter [those who]
would have foreseen or appreciated the risk and thus have had
the chance of .  .  . avoiding it.  Nor can it deter [those] who
share the accused’s lack of perspicacity because, ex facie, they
would not have foreseen or appreciated the risk either.20
Yet, pace Smith and Hogan, criminal punishment for culpable negli-
gence (that is, negligence that rises to the level of criminally culpable clue-
lessness) may be justifiable in some circumstances.  First, given that, ex
hypothesi, the actor is culpable (blameworthy) for being so clueless, retribu-
tive considerations weigh in favor of punishment.  For, criminal punish-
ment is, inter alia, an effective means of communicating blame and
censure.  Where the communication of blame and censure are apt (that is,
where one is worthy of blame), then there is at least something to be said in
favor of punishment.21  On a related note, there is something to be said in
favor of punishment of the criminally culpably clueless insofar as it may
“serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing
[the culpably clueless person’s] attention on his crime and its implica-
tions, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes.”22
Consequentialist considerations may weigh in favor of punishing the
criminally culpably clueless as well.  For example, both the incapacitation
of those who culpably fail to recognize the risks of harm they pose to
others, as well as the possibility of educating individuals to be more atten-
tive to such risks, ground considerations weighing in favor of punishment.
Moreover, the threat of punishment may motivate actors in the commu-
nity at large to be more attentive to the risks they pose to others.  Thus,
while Hogan may have been right to think that those who “share the ac-
cused’s lack of perspicacity” cannot be deterred because they simply will
not foresee or appreciate risks, he may have too quickly discounted the
19. Hogan, supra note 2, at 694.
20. Id.
21. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993).
22. See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), available at http://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/legal-
punishment/ [https://perma.cc/8DJ9-Z5LW] (citations omitted).  This account
of punishment as communicating blame and censure owes much to Antony Duff’s
work. See generally R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY
(2001).
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role of the criminal law in creating a more perspicacious community in
general.23
II. THE ENGLISH APPROACH TO DEFINING RAPE
To summarize and segue, Smith and Hogan defended a subjectivist
approach to criminal responsibility, one which demands both that each
element of the actus reus have a corresponding mens rea element, and
that the mens rea include a subjective awareness of risk taking.  This way of
thinking about criminal responsibility has been tremendously impactful in
shaping the way the mens rea of rape has been conceptualized in England.
In the context of sexual offenses, Smith and Hogan’s general framework
has influenced English courts to frame, with admirable clarity, the precise
issues that should be addressed when deciding whether to hold a defen-
dant criminally responsible for rape.  While it is submitted that the an-
swers provided by the House of Lords and Parliament have not always
been correct, at least they have been asking the right kind of questions.
Meanwhile, many American courts have been largely incapable of asking
the right kind of questions regarding the mens rea of rape, because they
continue to be influenced by an outdated common law approach to defin-
ing the actus reus elements and a resulting failure to appreciate the need
to define mens rea elements.
This Section will briefly outline the English approach to mens rea in
rape, illustrating the influence of Smith and Hogan’s subjectivist account
of criminal responsibility and observing the more objectivist approach that
currently prevails in England.  It will then compare approaches to defin-
ing the mens rea of rape that remain prevalent in many American jurisdic-
tions and suggest three ways in which Americans should learn from the
English approach.
English criminal law has long recognized that each element of the
actus reus of rape should have a corresponding mens rea element.  Which
is to say, the English have long recognized the principle of correspon-
dence.24  Over time, however, both the elements of the actus reus of rape
and the level of mens rea that should be required in correspondence to
the actus reus of the victim’s non-consent has changed considerably in
English law.
At common law, the actus reus elements of rape consisted of “the
carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will”—with the lat-
ter phrase “against her will” taken to incorporate elements of both non-
consent and physical resistance by the victim.25  While the common law
23. For a brief overview of key arguments in the debate regarding criminal
negligence, see CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 273–91 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen
Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
24. The principle of correspondence was first coined by Andrew Ashworth in
his first edition of treatise, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 129–30 (1991).
25. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch.
15 (Univ. of Chi. 1979) (1769).
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definition did not specify the mens rea required for the offense, the
House of Lords had the opportunity to clarify that matter in the infamous
case of DPP v. Morgan.26  In his remarks at Villanova, Smith explained the
basic facts of the case with characteristic brevity:
[T]he defendant invited three friends to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, telling them that she would like them to do so and
ignore any show of resistance because this was merely to add to
her pleasure.  The three men had intercourse with Mrs. Morgan
who did not in fact consent.  They were charged with rape . . . .27
The key issue in Morgan concerned the mens rea element that must
be proven in correspondence to the element of the victim’s non-con-
sent.28  Specifically, if the defendants held an honest belief that the victim
was consenting, would such belief negate the mens rea of rape, even if that
belief was wholly unreasonable?29  In rejecting the Crown’s plea that only
a reasonable mistake should lead to acquittal, the House of Lords, in ef-
fect, ruled that rape is not a crime that can be committed by mere negli-
gence as to the victim’s consent.
The Morgan rule, coined the “rapists’ charter,” was widely criticized in
England and abroad.30  Not only did the ruling exonerate defendants who
reasonably should have known that they were engaging in sexual inter-
course without their victims’ consent, Morgan endorsed a definition of the
actus reus of rape that required four elements: (1) unlawful (meaning,
here, outside of marriage); (2) sexual intercourse with a woman; (3) with-
out her consent; (4) by force, fear, or fraud.31
Parliament acted quickly to ameliorate some of Morgan’s impact, in
the Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act of 1976, which clarified that the
actus reus elements of rape do not require proof of force, fear, or fraud.
Instead, Parliament established that rape consists simply of sexual inter-
26. [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.), (1975) 2 W.L.R. 913 (H.L.).
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 1187.
28. The actus reus elements of force and whether the conduct was in fact
“against [the victim’s] will” were not at issue on appeal.
29. The trial court had instructed the jury that the defendant’s belief in con-
sent must be reasonable.  Despite what the Law Lords viewed as an erroneous jury
instruction, the House of Lords upheld the rape convictions on grounds that the
evidence established beyond any doubt that the defendants in fact knew that the
victim was not consenting.
30. See, e.g., JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 119 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 2002) (1987); E.M. Curley, Excusing Rape, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 325
(1976).
31. See Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone)
(“Rape consists in having unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her
consent by force, fear or fraud.” (quoting ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVI-
DENCE AND PRACTICE (38th ed. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The
marital rape exemption was eventually eliminated in R v. R, [1992] 1 A.C. 599,
(1991) 3 W.L.R. 767.
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course without consent.32  Moreover, the Sexual Offenses (Amendment)
Act of 1976 established that the mens rea of rape does not require proof of
an intention to engage in sexual intercourse without the victim’s consent.
Rather, Parliament provided that either knowledge or recklessness would
suffice to establish mens rea in correspondence to the victim’s consent.
After decades of debate and activism, the subjectivist rule regarding
the mens rea of rape was eventually superseded by Parliament in the Sex-
ual Offenses Act 2003.  According to this definition, which remains the
current legal definition of rape in England, the offense consists of the
following elements:
Rape
(1) A person (A) commits [rape] if—
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of
another person (B) with his penis,
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having
regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken
to ascertain whether B consents.33
Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the actus reus of the offense
consists of two elements: (1) penetration of the victim by the defendant
(the conduct element) and (2) the victim’s non-consent (a circumstance
element).  The correspondence principle is clearly on display in the re-
quirement that mens rea be proven in correspondence to each element of
the actus reus.
While the mens rea of intention remains in place in correspondence
to the penetration element of the actus reus, the key transformation
brought about by the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 was to reject the Morgan
rule’s subjectivist approach to mens rea regarding consent, and thus make
rape a crime of negligence as to the victim’s non-consent.  As Chris Clark-
son explains, “previously the requisite mens rea involved proof of either
knowledge of lack of consent or subjective recklessness as to the lack of
consent; under the Act all that has to be established is that the defendant
did not reasonably believe there was consent.”34
In sum, there are three aspects of the English approach to defining
rape worthy of particular note.  First, at least since the Morgan ruling in
1975, English criminal law has adhered to the principle of correspon-
dence in defining rape, which is to say, each element of the actus reus has
required proof of a corresponding mens rea.  Second, at least since the
32. To be clear, the requirements that the victim be a woman, not the wife of
the defendant, and that the sexual intercourse consist of penile–vaginal penetra-
tion all remained in place.
33. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 1 (U.K.).
34. CLARKSON, supra note 13, at 74 (second emphasis added).
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Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act 1976, English criminal law has defined
rape such that the key difference between lawful sexual intercourse and
rape turns on whether the victim consented.35  Third, since 2003, English
criminal law has recognized that negligence with respect to the victim’s
non-consent is a sufficient mens rea to establish the offense of rape.
III. WHAT AMERICA STILL NEEDS TO LEARN FROM ENGLAND
American jurisdictions would do well to follow England’s example
when it comes to defining rape.  First, American courts should adhere to
the correspondence principle, so that they can begin to ask the right kinds
of questions regarding how to define rape.  Second, American legislatures
should follow Parliament’s example from forty years ago, when it recog-
nized that the key to distinguishing sexual intercourse from the actus reus
of rape consists in the victim’s non-consent, without any further proof of
force or resistance.  Finally, American jurisdictions (whether through leg-
islative enactments or judicial opinions) should embrace negligence re-
garding the victim’s non-consent as a sufficient mens rea of rape.  This
Section will unpack each of these issues and briefly consider the lessons
Americans still need to learn from England.
First, due to a failure to adhere to the correspondence principle, sev-
eral American jurisdictions have failed to formulate the right kind of ques-
tions regarding the definition of rape.  Indeed, due to one such failure,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently found
itself unable to unable to determine what level of mens rea applied to lack
of consent under Connecticut law.36  In what is appropriately character-
ized as the “[m]orass of mens rea in American rape law,” Robin Charlow
summarizes the state of affairs as follows:
[S]ome state statutes define rape . . . with no specification of cul-
pable mental state in the statute.  In these jurisdictions, case law
may or may not clearly supply the missing required mens rea for
the nonconsent element.
Other [states’] rape statutes specify a culpable mental state
in conjunction with the act of intercourse, but do not include any
mental state specifically with regard to [the] element [of the vic-
35. Issues noted in supra note 29 aside, the acceptance of rape as “sex without
consent” was underscored in R v. Olugboja, [1982] QB 320, (1981) 3 All ER 443:
“In relation to a charge of rape, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act
1956 as amended by section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, the
only question concerning the actus reus is ‘At the time of the sexual intercourse did
the woman consent to it?’”
36. See Efstathiadis v. Holder, 752 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2014) certified question an-
swered by 119 A.3d 522 (Conn. 2015). Efstathiadis is a promising example of Ameri-
can courts beginning to formulate the right kind of questions to define rape.
However, it is to be regretted that Connecticut had not yet framed the issue in this
way nor provided a clear answer until 2014, when the issue was presented as a
certified question from the United States circuit court.
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tim’s non-consent] . . . . Case law may or may not clarify the
matter.
In yet other jurisdictions, rape is so defined that [the victim’s
non-]consent does not appear to be an element.  Even under
these statutes, however, it is possible that consent becomes rele-
vant nonetheless, and therefore that the mens rea with respect to
consent is still in issue.  This could occur if the act element is
interpreted essentially to require proof of nonconsent.  For ex-
ample, a statute that defined rape as intercourse by forcible com-
pulsion could be read to require evidence of nonconsent in
order to establish the necessary force or compulsion.
Finally, some jurisdictions delineate a mens rea with regard
to [the victim’s] nonconsent . . . but then have a separate rule
allowing [that] a reasonable mistake of fact may qualify as a
defense . . . .
. . . .
After wading through the morass, it appears that the various
American jurisdictions require different mens rea to prove
rape . . . . In one state, it seems that the defendant must have a
purpose to have nonconsensual sex in order to commit rape.  In
other states, recklessness about nonconsent would seem to suf-
fice . . . . In other American jurisdictions, negligence with regard
to consent appears to be the current standard. And, in a number
of states, courts seem to treat the nonconsent element as one of strict liabil-
ity, requiring no mens rea for conviction.37
While varying approaches to criminal offense definitions are to be
expected in a federal system with fifty-two distinct criminal jurisdictions, it
should never be the case that a serious criminal offense such as rape would
be treated as a strict liability offense.  Recall the words of Sir John Smith,
from his Villanova address:
[I]n most crimes, particularly serious crimes, [the prosecution]
must . . . prove a degree of fault with respect to each element of
the offense . . . . If the defendant is to be held responsible for
causing the result in the circumstances in which it is a criminal
offense, it ought to be shown that he was at fault with respect to
each of these elements.38
Yet, in many American jurisdictions, the prosecution is not required
to prove any mens rea corresponding to the victim’s non-consent.39  If
American jurisdictions recognized the importance of clearly defining not
37. Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 272–81 (2002) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
38. Smith, supra note 1, at 1179.
39. See Charlow, supra note 37, at 281 n.68; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SEX-
UAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Discussion Draft No. 5 2015).
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only the actus reus elements of criminal offenses, but also clearly defining
the mens rea elements that correspond to each of the actus reus elements,
it would be unthinkable that a serious offense such as rape would be re-
garded as a crime of strict liability in so many American jurisdictions.
Second, American legislatures would do well to follow the example of
English criminal law in terms of how to define the actus reus elements of
rape.  In defining the actus reus elements of what separates non-criminal
conduct (sexual intercourse) from criminal conduct (rape), the goal
should be to identify all—and only—those elements that make the con-
duct a public wrong that calls for both condemnation and punishment by
the State.40  If the actus reus fails to include such elements, the offense
definition will be overly broad, with attendant risks of impermissibly
prohibiting conduct that is either not wrongful all-things-considered, is
merely a private wrong, or is a public wrong, but one that does not call for
State condemnation and punishment.  Conversely, if the actus reus in-
cludes additional elements above and beyond that which makes the con-
duct a public wrong that calls for State condemnation and punishment, it
will result in an overly narrow definition of the offense, with attendant
risks that the State will fail in its duty to exercise due diligence in protect-
ing people from violence.41
England marks the distinction between sexual intercourse and rape
according to whether the intercourse was non-consensual, with no addi-
tional requirement that the offense be committed through the use of phys-
ical force, or that the victim physically resist.42  In so doing, England
joined the “universal trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essen-
tial element of rape.”43  This approach should be emulated in American
jurisdictions for three reasons.
First, marking non-consent as the key element distinguishing sexual
intercourse from rape reflects a correct understanding of the wrongness of
rape as consisting, primarily, in a violation of the victim’s sexual auton-
40. By the phrase “a public wrong that calls for State condemnation and pun-
ishment,” I mean that the State would be justified in condemning and punishing
the wrongdoing.  In my view, there is no overarching principle to identify when
these conditions are satisfied. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Public Wrongs and the
‘Criminal Law’s Business’: When Victims Won’t Share, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY DUFF 254, 254–72 (Rowan Cruft, Mat-
thew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff eds., 2011).
41. On the principle of due diligence, see Yakin Ertu¨rk, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence
Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).
42. See Sexual Offenses Act, 2003, c. 42, § 1 (U.K).
43. M.C. v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 39272/98, para. 161 (2003); see also Samuel
W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 570 (2015) (“When the
concepts of force and resistance controlled the law of rape, consent lingered off-
stage, rarely a significant player because of rape law’s hugely underinclusive scope,
both de jure and de facto.  Force and resistance requirements were so demanding
they eclipsed inquiry into consent.”) (footnotes omitted).
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omy.44  Second, given the absurdly low rates of rape prosecution through-
out America, it is unwise to require proof of actus reus elements that go
above and beyond what is required to make the conduct into a public
wrong that calls for State condemnation and punishment.  Retaining su-
perfluous elements of force and resistance in defining the actus reus ele-
ments of rape simply makes it all the more difficult to prosecute this
offense, resulting in the failure of American jurisdictions to fulfill their
due diligence obligations.45  Third, for strictly pragmatic reasons, it would
be wise for American jurisdictions to make non-consent the key to distin-
guishing sexual intercourse from rape, in order to track the substantive
offense definition for rape that is used by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Re-
porting system.46
Finally, American jurisdictions should follow England’s lead in adopt-
ing a negligence standard for defining the mens rea corresponding to the
victim’s non-consent.  Which is to say, if someone A sexually penetrates a
non-consenting person B, and A should have recognized a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that B was not consenting, but culpably failed to do so,
then A should be guilty of rape.47  Recall, the standard here is not simply
civil negligence.  In order to be properly held criminally responsible, the
defendant’s failure to recognize the risk that the victim is not consenting
must be a culpable negligence—so culpable as to merit criminal condemna-
tion and punishment.  Not every instance of negligence will amount to
culpable negligence—and so, not every instance of negligence should sat-
isfy the criminal mens rea of rape.  Excusable ignorance would not incul-
pate, but callously self-motivated blindness to the victim’s non-consent
may do so.  Not only would a negligence standard allow for conviction in
cases such as Morgan, it would create a vehicle for communities to discern
and articulate sharper social norms regarding what constitutes a reasona-
ble belief that sexual consent has been communicated.  As Samuel Buell
correctly observes, the very fact that social norms regarding consent to sex
are contested and in flux speaks in favor of adopting a negligence
standard:
44. See John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ES-
SAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 193 (Series No. 4, Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).  I add the
qualifier “primarily” to signal my view that an important part of the wrongness of
rape consists in its tendency to sustain and perpetuate patriarchy.
45. See Cory Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape
Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014).  For a discussion of due diligence, see supra
note 41.
46. See UCR Program Changes Definition of Rape, FBI (Mar. 2012), https://www
.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/march-2012/ucr-program-changes-definition-of-
rape [https://perma.cc/4JAD-P56Q].
47. To be clear, the definition of negligence I have in mind here would fur-
ther require the prosecution to prove that the risk of B’s non-consent was “of such
a nature and degree that the actor’s [A’s] failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his [A’s] conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involve[d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in [A’s] situation.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d)(1962).
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The mens rea problem [in defining rape] is this: if consent to sex
is normative and [mens rea requires that] the defendant must be
culpable with respect to consent, then arguably the defendant
has to be culpable with respect to norms.  When the law says, “He
knew he did not have consent,” it means, “He knew this was not a
situation that society recognizes as consensual sex.”  When norms
about sexual behavior are evolving, and the law is dealing with a
crime that presents difficult evidentiary problems in general, the
culpability analysis can be challenging in at least some cases.
One way to reduce the difficulty is to reduce culpability
requirements. . . .
If rape is a crime of negligence as to the victim’s lack of con-
sent, the law still has to draw lines about what counts as legal
consent.  And the law still has to determine whether the line was
clear enough in any particular case that a reasonable person
would know the geography. But it does not need to concern itself with
any account the defendant wishes to put forward about his own under-
standing of norms.48
By adopting a negligence standard for defining the mens rea of rape
in correspondence to the victim’s non-consent, we both honor the subjec-
tivist principle of correspondence and avoid deferring to the defendant’s
own peculiar understanding of what counts as consent to sex.  Defendants
such as the gang rapists in Morgan will not win acquittal by arguing that,
according to their subjective view of things, a woman screaming “no” while
being restrained and penetrated was consenting—and defendants moti-
vated into self-deception will not be entitled to “read[ ] screams as squeaks
of pleasure, or resistance as play . . . .”49
Smith and Hogan, no doubt, would agree with some, but not all, of
my recommendations regarding what America still needs to learn from
England.  They would surely agree with my endorsement of the correspon-
dence principle and resulting critique of strict liability as the mens rea of
rape in some American jurisdictions.  With respect to my second recom-
mendation, I have no reason to suppose that Smith or Hogan would object
to defining the actus reus of rape in terms that make the victim’s non-
consent the key feature distinguishing sexual intercourse from rape.50  No
doubt, however, Smith and Hogan would be less than enthusiastic regard-
ing my endorsement of an objectivist approach to defining the mens rea
48. Buell, supra note 43, at 579–80 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
49. See Sara Hinchliffe, Rape Law Reform in Britain, 37 SOC’Y 57, 59 (2000)
(citing NATASHA WALTER, THE NEW FEMINISM (1999)).
50. The non-consent based definition was not terrifically controversial.  See,
however, Victor Tadros’s intriguing argument in favor of a differentiated offense
of rape, which “would allow the law to express that violence is central to the of-
fence of rape where violence is present, but it would also allow convictions of rape
where there is no violence.”  Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 515, 515 (2006).
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of rape.  For, according to their subjectivist account of criminal responsi-
bility, cases like Morgan were correctly decided.  On their view, rapists who
believe they are obtaining consent, no matter how absurdly unreasonable
those beliefs might be, are not subjectively reckless and thus should not be
held criminally responsible for their conduct.  On my view, however, there
may be some cases of negligence that do rise to the level of culpable clue-
lessness, such that the criminal law would be justified in condemning and
punishing the culpably negligent rapists.  On that issue, I must, with deep
respect, disagree with Smith and Hogan.
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